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1The Effects of Regional and Industry–Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of region and industrywide spillovers
from foreign direct investment (FDI) on the volumes of export of Ukrainian manu-
facturing ﬁrms, using (name of the data set) panel data from 1996-2000. Economic
theory suggests that FDI has direct and indirect eﬀects on ﬁrm’s performance. Our
analysis focuses on the indirect eﬀects like competition and linkage eﬀects through
industrial and regional spillovers respectively. We use a simple Cournot competi-
tion model in order to test for industrial and regional spillovers. The estimation
results suggest that large ﬁrms, durablegoods makers, and ﬁrms located in urban
areas beneﬁt most from FDI spillovers.
Keywords: transition economies, Ukraine, foreign direct investment, spillovers.
JEL classiﬁcation: L60, F23
21 Introduction
“In January 2003 Procter & Gamble announced it would be is closing its Tampax tampon
factory in Leigh Park, Havant, Hants, United Kingdom and shifting the production of
its factories in Boryspil, Kyiv Region, and Budapest, Hungary. Procter & Gamble says
the move is necessary to keep its business competitive. The Tambrands–Ukraine plant
in Boryspil was established ... The plant manufactures Tampax hygienic tampons a high
percentage of which are exported into the Eastern and Western European countries. ...
In November of 2002 Procter and Gamble Eastern Europe launched a new Distribution
Center in Lviv, Ukraine. The Distribution Center was the ﬁrst in Ukraine and the second
in Eastern Europe. This P&G complex includes customs operations, storage, pre–sale
preparation according to the needs of consumers, forming of the orders and loading of
goods.”1
Indeed, Procter & Gamble have penetrated the Ukrainian market. However, several
questions arise: What has happened to Ukrainian companies in the same industry?
Have other ﬁrms in the same region been aﬀected? Do domestic ﬁrms proﬁt from new
technologies introduced by P&G or do they exit the market, unable to compete?
Theory tells us about direct and indirect eﬀects of foreign direct investment. Foreign
companies hire local workers and increase aggregate demand and supply. At the same
time, there are indirect eﬀects also called spillover eﬀects. The channels of these eﬀects
are: technology transfer eﬀect, competition eﬀect, backward and forward linkage eﬀect,
training eﬀect, and demonstration eﬀect.
The technology transfer channel has recently received justiﬁcation theoretically (Blom-
str¨ om, 1987; Blomstr¨ om and Kokko, 1997) and empirically through investigations for
Indonesia (Sj¨ oholm, 1999) and Russia (Ponomareva, 2000; Yudaeva et al., 2001). It is
also found that foreign presence in the sector does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀects on
productivity of Czech manufacturing ﬁrms (Kinoshita, 2000) or similar ﬁrms in Wroclaw
1Citation: http://www.ukraineinfo.us/business/investment.html
3region, Poland (Hardy, 1998).
The competition eﬀect is found to have both positive and negative impacts. Positive
spillovers are found in Canadian and Australian manufacturing industries (Caves, 1974),
and in Indonesian banks (Cho, 1990). However, negative eﬀects are observed in Belgian
manufacturing industries (De Backer and Sleuwgagen, 2003). Konings (2001) uses ﬁrm–
level panel data from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania to ﬁnd that only in Poland foreign
ﬁrms outperform domestic ﬁrms, while there is evidence for negative (Bulgaria and
Romania) or no (Poland) spillovers of FDI. He concludes that during earlier stages
of transition (Bulgaria and Romania) the positive technology spillover eﬀect seems to
be dominated by the negative competition eﬀect of FDI, as ineﬃcient domestic ﬁrms
will lose market share to foreign ﬁrms. In later stages of development (Poland), when
domestic ﬁrms have started restructuring, and market competition has increased, the
competition eﬀect seems to disappear.
FDI–induced backward and forward linkages can push industrial development, espe-
cially with regard to the formation of small businesses. FDI creates backward linkages,
for instance, by foreign ﬁrms purchasing local services and subcontracting with domes-
tic ﬁrms. Observing small businesses along the border of Mexico, it is found that the
linkage approach reasonably describes the development of small business employment
(Brown, 2002). On the other hand, there is little evidence for both backward and for-
ward linkages for the German–owned manufacturing sector in the north–east of England
(Kirchner, 2000) and for Korean FDI in southeast Asia, (Lee 1994).
The investigation of the training spillovers channel has also recently received atten-
tion from researchers. Foreign ﬁrms invest in human capital, and it is not only the
foreign MNC but also domestic ﬁrms that beneﬁt from this. Many managerial people in
Mexico start their career in a foreign company and are later employed in a domestic ﬁrm
(Blomstr¨ om, 1989). Moreover, domestic ﬁrms are afraid of loosing their market shares
and they too invest in training their workers and managerial personnel (Kinoshita, 1998).
Although demonstration eﬀect is potentially very important, so far there are not
4enough studies to show this, neither are there enough studies which distinguish demon-
stration eﬀects in diﬀerent countries or industries (Blomstr¨ om and Kokko, 1998). In an
analysis of Belgian manufacturing ﬁrms it is observed that although in the short term
FDI might crowd out domestic ﬁrms, in the long run, positive structural eﬀects such as
demonstration eﬀects might lessen or even inverse the crowding out eﬀects (de Backer
and Sleuwgagen, 2003).
However, all empirical papers above have a rather weak theoretical background.
We contribute to the existing literature on foreign direct investment by developing a
simple Cournot competition model augmented with spillover eﬀects and test this model
empirically using data of Ukrainian manufacturing ﬁrms.
The dataset used in this paper consists of an unbalanced panel of all manufactur-
ing ﬁrms in Ukraine obtained from the Education and Economic Research Consortium
(EERC) database over the 1996–2000 period. On balance, we have annual data on 8,500
ﬁrms, one quarter of which export their production.
This research provides evidence for a positive relationship between the optimal level
of exports and industry–wide spillovers from foreign direct investment. The magnitude
of these eﬀects varies between all, large and small ﬁrms, durable and non–durable goods
makers, large city and small town ﬁrms. Another signiﬁcant and positive factor in most
speciﬁcations is domestic investment on industry level, while the number of domestic
ﬁrms in the industry has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect.
The following section presents a simple Cournot competition model augmented with
spillover eﬀects. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 discusses the empirical
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and gives suggestions for policy makers.
52 Augmented Monopolistic Competition Model
2.1 The Model
A simple monopolistic competition model augmented with spillover eﬀects, implies that
domestic ﬁrm changes its quantities in response to foreign presence in the industry or
region.2 The home country economy consists of nH domestic ﬁrms and nF foreign ﬁrms
that compete at third country markets. All ﬁrms produce a homogeneous goods and
compete in quantities. We assume that the demand, P, for a good produced by both
domestic and foreign ﬁrm is linear. Let qH1 be a representative domestic ﬁrm’s output
and qF1 be a representative foreign ﬁrm’s output.3
P = a − b(nH − 1)qH − bqH1 − b(nF − 1)qF − byF1 (1)
Marginal cost of domestic ﬁrm is denoted as cH. Every domestic ﬁrm faces marginal
cost, but also spends jH for R&D investment. The ﬁrm cannot fully protect its stock
of knowledge, and the investment spills over to other ﬁrms. We denote θ as a spillover
coeﬃcient for funds invested by foreign ﬁrms (FDI) and ζ as a spillover coeﬃcient for
funds invested by (nH − 1) other domestic ﬁrms. We assume that the more other ﬁrms
invest, the lower marginal costs of the representative domestic ﬁrm are.
Similarly cF is the marginal cost of the foreign ﬁrm, but foreign ﬁrms are diﬀerently
aﬀected by spillovers compared to domestic ﬁrms. We denote β as spillover eﬀect from
the foreign sector and ψ as spillover eﬀect from the domestic sector. We also assume
1 > θ > ζ > 0 and 1 > β > ψ > 0, which means that spillover eﬀects from foreign
ﬁrms are stronger that those from domestic ﬁrms for any ﬁrm. A foreign ﬁrm also
invests jF in R&D. Moreover, domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt more from foreign spillovers, which
2See for example models by Siotis (1999), Leahy and Pavelin (2002).
3Symmetry among domestic ﬁrms and symmetry among foreign ﬁrms are assumed. However, do-
mestic ﬁrms technologies are diﬀerent from foreign ﬁrms’ ones.
6is represented by θ > β4
cH = w − θjFnF + jH [1 − ζ(nH − 1)] (2)
cF = w + jF [1 − β (nF − 1)] − ψjHnH (3)
Representative domestic and foreign ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts in the current period
of time as described in Equations (4) and (5):
max
qH1
PqH1 − cHqH1 (4)
max
qF1
PqF1 − cFqF1 (5)
Assuming symmetry we receive the following ﬁrst order conditions:
−2bqH + a − b(nH − 1)qH − b(nF − 1)qF − bqF − w +
nFθjF − [1 − ζ(nH − 1)] = 0
[−b(nF − 1) − b]qF + a − b(nH − 1)qH − bqH − b(nF − 1)qF −
bqF − w − jF [1 − β(nF − 1)] + ψjHnH = 0
Solving this system we receive optimal the quantity, qH, for the domestic ﬁrm:
qH =
nF [jF(θ + β + 1) + jHnH(ζ − ψ) − jH(1 + ζ)]




b(nH + 1 + nF)
+
−jH − jHζ + a − w + jHζnH
b(nH + 1 + nF)
This equation relates presence of foreign ﬁrms in the industry to the output of the
representative domestic ﬁrm.
Taking the derivative of equation (6) with respect to the number of foreign ﬁrms in
the industry, nF, we receive Equation (7), where the sign of the derivative can be either
4So far w is the same for both ﬁrms domestic and foreign. Later we relax this assumption allowing





nF [2jF(θ − β) + 2nHjF(θ − β) + jFnH(θ − β)]
b(nH + 1 + nF)2 + (7)
nH [jF(1 + θ + β) − jH(1 + ψ + ζ) + jHnH(ζ − ψ)]
b(nH + 1 + nF)2 +
−a + w + jF + jFβ + jFθ
b(nH + 1 + nF)2
The entrance of the foreign ﬁrm is likely to have positive eﬀects if the spillover eﬀect
from foreign to domestic ﬁrms is much higher compared to the spillover eﬀect from
foreign to foreign ﬁrm, θ >> β.
When the foreign ﬁrm enters the market it invests jF and the more it invests the




nFθ + βnF + nF + nF
2(θ − β)
b(nH + 1 + nF)
(8)
2.2 Model Parametrization
Equation (6) is not linear in nF, nH, jH, jF or w, and in Appendix 15, we transform it
into a linearized form:
ˆ qH,it = φ0 + φnF ˆ nF,it + φnHˆ nH,it + φjHˆ jH,it + φjFˆ jF,it + φw ˆ wit (9)
ˆ wit is parameterized as a linear function of the deviation in several regional spillovers,
scale variables and volume of q at t − 1.6 The reasoning for this parametrization is the
following. Every ﬁrm has its speciﬁc marginal cost, that depends not only on ﬁrm
characteristics but also on the ﬁrm’s environment. This marginal cost is higher if the
number of potential customers is low or transaction costs are high. Thus, if a ﬁrm is
surrounded by a richer variety of other ﬁrms who also invest in R&D or have some
experience of selling the product, then its costs have to be lower.
ˆ wit = ξ0i + ξSC ˆ Scaleit + ξxF ˆ xF,it + ξxHˆ xH,it + ξyF ˆ yF,it + ξyHˆ yH,it + ξqˆ qit−1 + it (10)
5The coeﬃcients are described there.
6We parametrize ˆ wit because we do not have any data on ﬁrm’s costs.
8where ξ0i is the ﬁrm–speciﬁc level of marginal cost, which enters as the ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀect, ˆ Scaleit is the deviation in the size of the ﬁrm, ˆ xF,it is the deviation in the number
of foreign ﬁrms in the region, ˆ xH,it is the deviation in the number of domestic ﬁrms in
the region, ˆ yF,it is the deviation in the volume of FDI for a ﬁrm in the region, ˆ yH,it is
the deviation in the volume of domestic investment for a ﬁrm in the region, ˆ qit−1 is the
deviation in the volume of production in the previous period and it is an error term.
Plugging Equation (10) into Equation (9) we receive our econometric model speciﬁ-
cation:
ˆ qH,it = φ0t + φwξ0i + φnF ˆ nF,it + φnHˆ nH,it + φjHˆ jH,it + φjFˆ jF,it + φsc + (11)
+ ˆ Scaleit + φwξxF ˆ xF,it + φwξxHˆ xH,it + φwξyF ˆ yF,it + φwξyHˆ yH,it +
+ φWξqˆ qi,t−1 + φwit
The data on ﬁrms’ investment is not present in our dataset and we transform our model
into the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation
ˆ qit = φ0 + φwξ0i + (φnF − φjF)ˆ nF,it + (φnH − φjF)ˆ nH,it + φjH ˆ JH + (12)
+ φjF ˆ JF,it + φwξsc ˆ Scaleit + φw(ξxF − ξyF)ˆ xF,it + φw(ξxH − ξyH)ˆ xH,it +
+ φwξyF ˆ YF,it + φwξyH ˆ YH,it + φWξqˆ qi,t−1 + φwit
where (the natural logarithm of) the volume of export is the dependent variable, JH
is the total volume of domestic investment in the industry, JF is the total volume of
foreign investment in the industry, YH is the total volume of domestic investment in the
region and YF is the volume of foreign investment in the region. Because of our data
restrictions we investigate the spillover eﬀect only for exporting ﬁrms.7
We would expect a positive sign on φnF if higher levels of export are associated with
a higher number of foreign ﬁrms in the industry, and a negative sign on φnH if higher
7We made an attempt to employ sales as a dependent variable but received strong misspeciﬁcation
of our model.
9levels of export have a negative correlation with a higher number of domestic ﬁrms in
the industry. The scale eﬀect is proxied by the number of workers in the ﬁrm.
According to our model, the competition eﬀect is captured by industry spillovers
variables.8 This can be explained by the fact that increased foreign presence in the
industry forces local ﬁrms to act more eﬃciently, improve the quality of their product,
decrease the primary cost of production, and to start exporting the goods. However, it
is possible to receive negative eﬀects, namely when foreign ﬁrms penetrate the domestic
industry in order to buy the exporting ﬁrms and capture their shares in third country
markets.9
Forward-backward linkages eﬀect can appear through regional spillovers.10 Foreign-
owned ﬁrms usually require high quality input materials which leads to an improvement
of local material supplies. For instance, Oleh Strekal, spokesman for McDonald’s Ukraine
Limited, said in his interview “.... the fast food monolith has pumped some 70 million
USD into its Ukrainian ventures, with most of the funds ﬂowing into the local economy.
McDonald’s has kept 50 Ukrainian construction companies busy building outlets across
Ukraine. Domestic vendors Chumak, Galakton, Slavyansky Dom and the Vinnytsya
meat processing plant supply products that ﬁnd their way into McDonald’s hamburgers
and shakes. Ukrainian ingredients now account for about 40 percent of McDonald’s
products. The company plans to increase that ﬁgure to 95 percent within two years.”11
It is very diﬃcult to distinguish the other spillover channels, due to data limitations.
Identifying demonstration eﬀect and training eﬀect would require additional ﬁrm speciﬁc
variables such as labor turnover, innovation, et cetera.
8In our paper these eﬀect are described by the number of foreign ﬁrms in the industry and the
volume of foreign direct investment in the industry.
9It can be a case when a foreign ﬁrm wants to acquire the domestic company in the same industry
in order to close the latter and capture a larger share of the market.
10We proxy regional spillovers by the number of foreign ﬁrms in the region and the volume of foreign
direct investment in the region.
11Citation: http://www.artukraine.com/commercial/mcdonalds2.htm
103 Data description
We use a dataset of Ukrainian manufacturing ﬁrms for testing our hypotheses. It covers
on average 8,500 ﬁrms for the period 1996 to 2000. 2,100 of these ﬁrms export their
products. The ﬁrms are classiﬁed by a two–digit Industrial Classiﬁcation and represent
sixteen industrial sectors: energy, fuel, coal, black metallurgy, color metallurgy, chemical,
oil–chemicals, machinery, forest, construction materials, light, food, ﬂavor, microbiology,
medical equipment, printing and other. Firms are localized over twenty seven geograph-
ical regions, covering Crimea Autonomous Republic, twenty four “oblast”, cities Kyiv
and Sevastopil. We utilize EERC’s data items “volumes of export”, Export in our an-
notation, and ”number of workers”, Labor here.12 Moreover, as a proxy for the number
of ﬁrms in the industry or in the region we use the number of ﬁrms in our dataset.13
A number of sample selection criteria is applied to the original sample. First, all
negative values for volume of export and number of workers variables in the sample are
dropped.14 Secondly, the ﬁrms with a volume of exports higher than the 99 percentile
or lower than the 1 percentile are also excluded. We prefer to use the screened data to
reduce the potential impact of outliers upon the parameter estimates. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for ﬁrm speciﬁc variables.
In order to test the eﬀects of spillovers on ﬁrms facing similar characteristics, the
dataset is split into two categories: large and small ﬁrms. A ﬁrm is considered to be
“large” if its number of workers is above the 75th percentile by year. If a ﬁrm’s number
of workers is below the 25th percentile by year, then it is classiﬁed as “small”.15 A two–
sample paired t–test is used to test for the equality of means and we receive signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the behavior of large and small ﬁrms.
12Export is estimated in 1,000 USD.
13Our data are assumed to cover all manufacturing production in Ukraine. However, it is just a proxy
for the number of ﬁrms in the region or industry because some data could be lost during the process of
collecting.
14None of our variables can have negative values.
15A similar categorization is done by Baum et al. (2003a)
11Moreover, we investigate the spillover eﬀect for “durable” and “non–durable” goods
makers. This classiﬁcation is based on the dichotomy proposed by Sharpe (1994): First,
we ﬁnd the correlation between sales and nominal GNP. Second, ﬁrms with an average
correlation higher than 60th percentile are considered as durable goods makers, while
ﬁrms with correlation on average lower than 40th percentile are denoted as non–durable
goods makers.
In order to control for agglomeration eﬀects, we consider a subsample of “city” ﬁrms
located in regions where there are cities with population one million or more.16 Com-
pared to the rest of the country’s average, all these regions are characterized by much
higher volumes of FDI and a higher number of manufacturing ﬁrms receiving FDI. For
example, on average 112 such ﬁrms are located in the Dnipropetrovsk region which is
more than the total of FDI ﬁrms in Kherson, Chernivtsi, Chernigiv, Kirovograd and
Volyn region. “Ncity” ﬁrms are located in the remaining regions.
From the data distribution by industry (Table 4) we see that some industries are
characterized by high levels of exports but low levels of FDI (e.g. color metallurgy) while
some are characterized by high levels of both exports and FDI (e.g. black metallurgy).
4 Regional and Industry–Wide Spillovers Eﬀects
We estimate Equation (12) for all ﬁrms and several splits of ﬁrms, using ordinary least
square, ﬁxed-eﬀect, one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and two-step
GMM estimation.17 The results are given in Tables 5-8. In all estimations, the dependent
variable is the logarithm of exports. The independent variables are number of workers;
the number of foreign/home ﬁrms in the region; the number of foreign/home ﬁrms in the
industry; the logarithm of investment of foreign/home ﬁrms in the region; the logarithm
16“City” ﬁrms are located in Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropertrovsk, Zaporizhzhia regions
and Kyiv city.
17We did not include the estimation using random–eﬀect estimator because because results of the
Hausman test strongly support the use of ﬁxed–eﬀect estimators.
12of investment of foreign/home ﬁrms in the industry and the lagged level of logarithm of
export.
Table 5, column (1) in the Appendix describes the results for OLS estimations. These
are ex ante biased but we still add them into the analysis for comparison.18 According to
them, entrance of one foreign ﬁrm has a positive eﬀect on exports in the same industry
and no signiﬁcant eﬀect at region level. The level of FDI in an industry is negatively
associated with the volume of exports, which is opposite to our anticipations. However,
the impact of domestic ﬁrms’ activity corresponds to our predictions. Higher levels of
domestic investment in the industry are correlated with higher levels of export in the
same industry, while the entrance of additional ﬁrms into the industry decreases volumes
of export in the same industry.
Fixed–eﬀect estimation results correspond better to our theoretical anticipations (Ta-
ble 5, column 2). They provide some evidence that there are positive industrial spillovers
from FDI, namely that there is a signiﬁcantly positive impact of foreign presence on
ﬁrms’ exports in the same industry. This suggests signiﬁcant linkage eﬀects. There are
also signiﬁcant eﬀects of the number of domestic ﬁrms on the volume of exports in the
same region (positive) and industry (negative).
Tables 6–8 describe the results of testing our theoretical model using dynamic panel
estimator for three diﬀerent splits: durable–gods makers and non–durable–goods mak-
ers; small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms; city ﬁrms and non–city ﬁrms. Columns (1) and (3) of
each table represent models using one–step estimation, while columns (2) and (4) de-
scribe two–step estimation. The model is estimated using an orthogonal transformation
instrumented by all available moment restrictions starting from (t − 1).19
18OLS results are upwards biased while ﬁxed eﬀect model results are downward biased. The coeﬃcient
???near lagged value??? of log of export for GMM estimation is between OLS and WITHIN estimators
that supports appropriateness of GMM usage. For details, see Bond (2002).








T − t − 1
1/2
13The correctness of the respective model speciﬁcation is checked using the Sargan
test. We compute the Sargan test for each two–step GMM model and we do not re-
ceive rejection for our overidentiﬁed restrictions at 10% level.20 Heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation are controlled for by using robust standard errors and by examining the
Arellano–Bond second order autocorrelation test. Consistency of GMM in our model
relies on the property that we do not have second- (or higher-) order autocorrelation.
Otherwise, we would have started with moment restrictions starting from t − 2.
In the analysis for the “all” ﬁrms dataset (Table 5, columns (3) and (4)), we receive
evidence for positive industry spillover eﬀects. For instance, the entrance of a foreign
ﬁrm in a region increases the exports of a company in that region by 0.52 %. Although
we do not ﬁnd strong evidence for regional spillovers of FDI on export, there is signiﬁcant
evidence for regional spillovers from domestic investment.
One interesting contrast is observed for the “durable” and “non–durable” goods
makers split as described in Table 6. Results for non–durable ﬁrms suggest positive
regional spillovers from domestic ﬁrms, while there seem to be no signiﬁcant eﬀects from
foreign ﬁrms at all. On the other hand, the results are much stronger for durable–goods
makers: Entrance of one foreign ﬁrm into the industry increases the level of exports of
a domestic ﬁrm in that industry by 0.94 %, while entrance of one foreign ﬁrm in the
region increases the level of exports of a domestic ﬁrm in the same region by 0.44%.
Comparing the results for “small” and “large” ﬁrms (Table 7), one can see that the
number of foreign ﬁrms in the region does not seem to have any eﬀect on small domestic
ﬁrms’ exports, while there are highly signiﬁcant regional spillovers for large ﬁrms (at
where the transformed variable does not depend on its lagged values. If we use ﬁrst diﬀerences instead
of an orthogonal transformation we will have to instrument with moment restrictions starting from t−2
which will lead to dropping additional 20% of the available data.
20Note, we do not report Sargan test results for one–step GMM results. Sargan test has an asymptotic
chi–squared distribution only in the case of homoscedastic error terms. Our dataset is very heteroscedas-
tic that is why we receive rejection of overidentifying restrictions in most cases. Arellano and Bond
(1991) also mention that the Sargan test on the one–step estimation often leads to rejection of the null
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
141% level): An increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms in the region by one increases
a domestic ﬁrm’s exports by 1.28 %. Concerning industry spillovers, the number of
foreign ﬁrms does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect at 5 %–level in either small or large
ﬁrms’ subsamples. The eﬀect of a domestic ﬁrms’ presence in the region is positive and
signiﬁcant at 1% for large ﬁrms only: A one unit rise in the number of domestic ﬁrms
in the industry raises domestic ﬁrms’ exports by 0.76 %. There is little evidence for
regional spillovers from domestic investment in the region. A similar picture evolves for
the number of domestic ﬁrms in the industry: The eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
The results for “city” and “ncity” ﬁrms (Table 8) are also quite striking: Firms in the
former category are signigicantly aﬀected by foreign ﬁrms’ activities. Entrance of one
foreign ﬁrm in the region or in the industry leads to an increase of the level of exports
by 1.10 % and 0.43 % respectively. The level of domestic investment in the region also
has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect, while the number of domestic ﬁrms has no eﬀect on
volumes of export. At the same time, “ncity” ﬁrms do not seem to beneﬁt from foreign
ﬁrms in the region or in the industry. However, those ﬁrms beneﬁt from both an increase
in domestic ﬁrms’ investment in the region and an increase in the number of ﬁrms in
the region.
In summary, we ﬁnd support for the model’s predictions on the eﬀect of industry–
wide FDI spillovers for the “all ﬁrms” data set of considered ﬁrms. However, the regional
spillover eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant. For diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms, we receive
varying results. The results are stronger for large ﬁrms, city ﬁrms and durable good
makers. For any speciﬁcation, there is no evidence for negative competition eﬀects.
Large ﬁrms can more easily adjust the quality of their production to meet the require-
ments of foreign ﬁrms in the region or even export their products. Similarly, Sinani
and Meyer (2002) argue that large ﬁrms have more resources to invest in absorbing new
technology of foreign ﬁrms, or to attract better qualiﬁed labor in order to cope with in-
creased competition from foreign ﬁrms. Interestingly, Aitken and Harrison (1999) arrive
15at quite diﬀerent results. In a study of 4000 Venezuelan ﬁrms, they concluded that only
small ﬁrms’21 productivity signiﬁcantly beneﬁts from FDI, while there is no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on large ﬁrms. Most foreign ﬁrms are located in the urban area, very few being
situated far from large cities. This is likely to decrease transaction costs for ﬁrms in
urban areas and create an environment in which industry–wide spillovers might be im-
portant, so that entrance of a foreign ﬁrm in a large city region has a larger eﬀect on
exports of a ﬁrm in an urban area than on a domestic ﬁrm in a non–urban area. Finally,
the industry–wide spillover eﬀect might be signiﬁcant for durable–goods makers because
this type of production requires higher level of backward and forward linkages within
the same industry.
5 Conclusions
We examine the eﬀect of industry–wide and region–wide spillovers on the optimal level
of exports. Based on a simple monopolistic competition model augmented with spillover
eﬀects, we hypothesize that a domestic manufacturing ﬁrm’s performance, measured
by the volume of exports, responds both to industry–wide and region–wide spillover
eﬀects. If foreign presence in the industry increases, then the volume of exports of a
representative ﬁrm should increase as well. The theoretical predictions concerning the
eﬀects of industry–wide spillover are ambigious, they can be either positive or negative.
To test this hypothesis we utilize a dataset of 8,000 ﬁrm years of Ukrainian manufacturing
ﬁrms.
Our empirical ﬁndings show that large ﬁrms beneﬁt more from foreign direct in-
vestment than small ﬁrms, because they have suﬃcient capacities to absorb foreign
ﬁrms technologies. Compared to non–durable goods makers, durable–goods makers are
to a higher extent aﬀected by industry–wide FDI spillovers, because production of a
durable good is likely to require a larger number of backward and forward linkages
21Deﬁned as ﬁrms with less than 50 workers.
16within both the same industry and region. Finally, urban area ﬁrms beneﬁt more from
FDI spillovers compared to ﬁrms in non–urban areas. FDI also promotes exports due
to regional spillovers. However, there is a threshold level of FDI which seems necessary
for indirect FDI eﬀects to occur.
Ukrainian ﬁrms do beneﬁt from foreign direct investment, and it seems desirable for
policy makers to attract as much of it as possible. Our results suggest that policies to
attract FDI might be too strongly concentrated on large ﬁrms in urban areas, as it is
there that industry– and region–wide spillovers are mostly present. Instead, it might be
desirable to also promote FDI inﬂows into those areas where spillovers are less present:
non–urban areas with small, non–durable goods producing ﬁrms. This would create even
stronger overall spillovers due to further backward and forward linkages, and therefore
beneﬁt the Ukrainian economy to a larger extent. The mechanism to achieve this could
consist in either the creation of a free trade zone in such areas or in giving additional tax
privileges to foreign ﬁrms investing there. In a similar manner, Blomstr¨ om and Kokko
(2003) have pointed out that technological spillovers are not an automatic consequence
of FDI, and that it is necessary to foster the learning and absorbing capacity of domestic
ﬁrms.
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20Appendix 1: Variables used in the paper
• EERC database
– Volume of Export
– Sales
– Number of domestic ﬁrms in industry or region
• http://upop.irex.ru/eco.asp
– Nominal Gross Domestic Product
– Producer Price Index (PPI)
• Ukrainian statistic yearbooks, 1996-2000
– Volume of domestic investment in industry and region
– Volume of foreign investment in industry and region
– Number of manufacturing ﬁrms with FDI in industry and region
21Appendix 2: Linearization of the expression for optimal production
level
Optimal quantity, q for the domestic ﬁrm:
q =
nF(jF(θ + β + 1) + jHnH(ζ − ψ) − jH(1 + ζ))




b(nF + 1 + nH)
+
−jH − jHζ + a − w + jHζnH
b(nH + 1 + nF)
We linearize this around equilibrium and receive
ˆ qH = φ0 + φnF ˆ nH + φnH ˆ nH + φjH ˆ jH + φjF ˆ jF + φw ˆ w
where ˆ k = dk/K, ˆ n = dn/n, ˆ i = di/i, ˆ j = dj/j and ˆ w = dw/w. The coeﬃcients are
equal to
φnF =
(nF)2(2jF(θ − β) + 2nHjF(θ − β) + jFnF(θ − β))
b(nH + 1 + nF)2 +
+
nF(−a + w + jF + jFβ + jFθ)
b(nH + 1 + nF)2 +
+
nFnH(jH(1 + θ + β) − jH(1 + ψ + ζ) + jHnH(ζ − ψ))
b(nH + 1 + nF)2
φjF =
jF(nFθ + βnF + nF + nF
2(θ − β))
b(nH + 1 + nF)
φnH =
nHnFjH(3ζ − ψ + 1) − nHnFjF(θ + β + 1) − nH(a − w − jH − 2jHζ)
b(nH + 1 + nF)2 +
+
nHn2
F(jH(ζ − ψ) + jF(β − θ))
b(nH + 1 + nF)2
φjH =
jH(nHζ + 1 + ζ) − nFjH(1 − nHζ + ζ + nHψ)
b(nH + 1 + nF)
φw = −
w
b(nH + 1 + nF)
Every domestic ﬁrm i at time t has
ˆ qH,it = φ0 + φnF ˆ nF,it + φnHˆ nH,it + φjHˆ jH,it + φjFˆ jF,it + φw ˆ wit
22Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all, small and large ﬁrms
µ σ2 p25 p50 p75
all
Exports, 1000 USD 4199.46 18759.46 63.80 321.25 1674.90
Number of workers 776.23 1304.24 180.00 372.00 808.50
F ﬁrms in region 91.39 108.25 33.00 52.00 109.00
F ﬁrms in industry 167.79 94.91 107.00 178.65 222.82
H ﬁrms in industry 1184.95 734.61 531.00 1384.18 1849.00
H ﬁrms in region 242.28 130.81 192.00 237.00 314.00
small
Exports, 1000 USD 741.50 2710.85 30.10 113.10 456.50
Number of workers 113.07 47.11 77.00 116.00 148.00
F ﬁrms in region 91.08 106.10 31.00 51.00 112.00
F ﬁrms in industry 175.03 104.59 89.00 178.65 224.00
H ﬁrms in industry 1273.95 773.83 568.00 1839.00 2009.00
H ﬁrms in region 238.13 121.35 190.00 237.00 310.00
large
Exports, 1000 USD 7109.07 25912.78 82.00 506.65 2912.00
Number of workers 2181.39 2019.02 1090.00 1535.00 2438.00
F ﬁrms in region 90.05 108.79 33.00 52.00 105.00
F ﬁrms in industry 153.53 84.31 89.00 178.65 215.00
H ﬁrms in industry 1049.48 685.27 501.00 1384.18 1839.00
H ﬁrms in region 240.31 135.16 190.00 237.00 303.00
Note: (i) p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while σ and µ represent its
standard deviation and mean respectively, (ii) F denotes ”foreign” and H stands for “home”.
23Table 2: Descriptive statistics for durable, non–durable goods makers, city
and non-city ﬁrms.
Variable µ σ2 p25 p50 p75
durable
Exports, 1000 USD 4756.43 22099.45 46.65 251.00 1612.25
Number of workers 691.28 1290.19 161.00 316.00 662.00
F ﬁrms in region 89.68 110.04 33.00 51.00 104.00
F ﬁrms in industry 164.41 92.31 107.00 178.65 222.82
H ﬁrms in industry 1140.18 731.79 531.00 1384.18 1849.00
H ﬁrms in region 236.13 128.62 190.00 237.00 303.00
non–dururable
Exports, 1000 USD 2782.76 10385.52 78.00 321.50 1297.00
Number of workers 801.15 1197.31 197.00 415.00 910.00
F ﬁrms in region 90.51 101.66 34.00 59.00 112.00
F ﬁrms in industry 171.02 97.39 89.00 203.00 222.82
H ﬁrms in industry 1233.71 737.15 568.00 1404.00 1849.00
H ﬁrms in region 250.37 128.50 193.00 243.00 329.00
city
Exports, 1000 USD 5491.93 22794.02 76.15 425.70 2161.80
Number of workers 967.40 1638.95 201.00 426.00 1049.00
F ﬁrms in region 161.10 138.03 80.00 113.00 160.00
F ﬁrms in industry 159.41 95.09 59.00 203.00 222.82
H ﬁrms in industry 1133.77 739.53 489.30 1384.18 1848.00
H ﬁrms in region 270.61 187.59 240.00 297.00 390.00
non–city
Exports, 1000USD 3314.32 15337.29 56.60 265.80 1369.40
Number of workers 635.93 965.35 170.00 345.00 694.00
F ﬁrms in region 43.65 33.02 24.00 35.00 51.00
F ﬁrms in industry 173.52 94.37 108.00 178.65 222.82
H ﬁrms in industry 1220.00 729.21 538.80 1384.18 1849.00
H ﬁrms in region 222.88 61.69 187.00 220.00 250.00
Note: (i) p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while σ and µ represent its
standard deviation and mean respectively, (ii) F denotes ”foreign” and H stands for “home”.
24Table 3: Descriptive statistics by region.
Variable Observations Export, 1000 USD Labor F Firms FDI, 1000 USD
Crimea 255 4287.36 637.14 43.6 26285.25
Sebastopol 82 543.30 271.11 3.8 2828.23
Vinnitsa 527 3151.69 484.60 28.6 3319.25
Volyn 292 1613.33 600.40 22.2 9275.58
Dnipropetrovsk 702 12978.69 1557.10 111.8 22247.36
Donetsk 886 7182.00 1260.43 101.1 41995.08
Zhytomyr 552 1778.49 602.83 34.8 4762.37
Zakarpattia 610 2800.53 438.86 133.4 13981.86
Zaporizhzhia 485 8983.56 1175.71 46.8 41098.11
Ivano–Frankivsk 396 3563.93 621.58 67.8 4406.80
Kyiv–city 727 3568.15 664.04 468.0 202988.80
Kyiv region 474 2459.85 495.66 64.8 43715.80
Kirovograd 256 1355.28 532.25 13.6 2551.80
Lugansk 488 6341.76 930.78 35.6 1532.92
Lviv 862 1795.17 598.26 170.0 21168.68
Mykolayiv 216 6575.36 1036.35 41.2 4933.74
Odesa 506 2136.08 433.98 113.6 25498.87
Poltava 463 5325.92 716.66 49.8 40003.81
Rivne 323 1930.70 540.50 23.8 6314.97
Sumy 410 4378.26 889.60 30.0 3702.03
Ternopil 256 1601.48 509.84 31.0 2532.29
Kharkiv 756 2630.41 966.15 72.8 15069.69
Kherson 151 2706.47 1097.91 48.2 6609.32
Khmelnytsky 414 2558.86 659.46 32.8 1675.11
Cherkasy 423 4888.08 605.59 48.2 2514.16
Chernivtsi 384 3115.57 563.14 17.2 5052.36
Chernigiv 218 1853.71 504.19 18.8 4379.49
Note: All variables are averaged over the period 1996–2000 for each region.
25Table 4: Descriptive statistics by industry.
Variable Observations Export, 1000 USD Labor F Firms FDI
Energy 46 1203.42 2794.00 1.8 1944.17
Fuel 96 19364.66 1261.24 15.6 50235.07
Ferrous metallurgy 491 20923.36 2032.58 27.6 34991.29
Non-ferrous metallurgy 105 20593.62 1138.44 14.0 23.45
Chemicals 498 10272.15 1139.57 90.6 8794.23
Oil–Chemicals 103 4431.05 833.66 6.4 6131.91
Metal processing 4237 3304.07 1002.01 242.6 59189.58
Wood and Paper 1308 1258.62 458.67 122.0 9043.57
Construction materials 906 1463.32 608.27 59.8 1276.98
Light 1285 4173.12 617.87 150.4 3517.94
Food 2420 2920.44 380.23 320.6 125075.00
Flavor 193 728.40 205.89 2.8 4.67
Microbiology 43 736.07 345.71 19.4 1316.25
Medical equipment 178 1782.20 567.60 19.8 5056.05
Printing 79 891.11 302.63 28.4 1214.89
Others 126 7849.95 381.95 28.2 1885.76
Note: All variables are averaged over the period 1996–2000 for each industry
26Table 5: OLS, Within and GMM estimations for all ﬁrms.
OLS WITHIN ONE–STEP TWO–STEP
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt−1 0.6761*** 0.0075 0.0635* 0.0240
( 0.0142 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.0370 ) ( 0.0392 )
Labort 0.2888*** 0.9447*** 0.3739 0.5562
( 0.0231 ) ( 0.1234 ) ( 0.3826 ) ( 0.3956 )
F ﬁrms in regiont -0.0001 0.0059*** 0.0056** 0.0039
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0029 )
F ﬁrms in industryt 0.0052*** 0.0075*** 0.0052*** 0.0064***
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0015 )
H ﬁrms in industryt -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0008*** -0.0007**
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0003 )
H ﬁrms in regiont 0.0000 0.0036*** 0.0031** 0.0039***
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0013 )
F investment in regiont 0.0017 -0.0277 -0.0038 -0.0364
( 0.0397 ) ( 0.0373 ) ( 0.0554 ) ( 0.0534 )
F investment in industryt -0.2044*** -0.0754*** -0.0491 -0.0360
( 0.0278 ) ( 0.0281 ) ( 0.0386 ) ( 0.0381 )
H investment in regiont 0.0705* 0.4922*** 0.8613*** 0.6773***
( 0.0409 ) ( 0.1361 ) ( 0.2659 ) ( 0.2504 )
H investment in industryt 0.1841*** 0.3958*** 0.1111 0.0265
( 0.0256 ) ( 0.0637 ) ( 0.1137 ) ( 0.1062 )
N 6009 5244 3545 3545
Sargan test – – – 0.109
SOC – – 0.964 0.863
R-sq 0.6176 0.0794 – –
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F ﬁrms in
region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedas-
tic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the
10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explana-
tory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano–Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all estimations
calculated using DPD package for Ox.
27Table 6: GMM estimation for durable and non–durable goods makers.
durable non-durable
one–step two–step one–step two–step
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt−1 0.0160 0.017 0.1647** 0.1235
( 0.0506 ) ( 0.0524 ) ( 0.0678 ) ( 0.0777 )
Labort 0.1183 0.0015 0.3545 0.0041
( 0.4937 ) ( 0.5150 ) ( 0.7672 ) ( 0.8634 )
F ﬁrms in industryt 0.0094** 0.0064*** 0.0012 -0.0003
( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0047 ) ( 0.0049 )
F ﬁrms in regiont 0.0044* 0.0069*** 0.0003 0.0042
( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0029 )
H ﬁrms in industryt -0.0010** -0.0011*** 0.0000 -0.0001
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 )
H ﬁrms in regiont 0.0024 0.0055 -0.0013 0.0012
( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 )
F investment in regiont 0.02557 0.0338 0.0067 0.0054
( 0.0745 ) ( 0.0693 ) ( 0.1002 ) ( 0.0969 )
F investment in industryt -0.0004 0.0263 -0.0480 -0.0348
( 0.0609 ) ( 0.0590 ) ( 0.0632 ) ( 0.0564 )
H investment in regiont 0.0608 -0.0115 1.0282** 0.8948*
( 0.3176 ) ( 0.3286 ) ( 0.4954 ) ( 0.4616 )
H investment in industryt -0.0905 -0.0011 0.1131 0.2364
( 0.1544 ) ( 0.1348 ) ( 0.2068 ) ( 0.1997 )
N 1396 1396 1186 1186
Sargan test – 0.140 – 0.363
SOC 0.871 0.829 0.132 0.185
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F ﬁrms in
region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedas-
tic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the
10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explana-
tory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano–Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all estimations
calculated using DPD package for Ox.
28Table 7: GMM estimation for small and large ﬁrms.
small large
one–step two–step one–step two–step
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt−1 -0.1595 -0.1592** -0.0084 -0.0038
( 0.0561 ) ( 0.0652 ) ( 0.0660 ) ( 0.0373 )
Labort 0.1832 0.3185 0.2974 0.8868
( 0.4010 ) ( 0.9579 ) ( 0.8127 ) ( 0.7684 )
F ﬁrms in industryt 0.0042 0.0072* -0.0035 0.0026
( 0.0044 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0076 ) ( 0.0074 )
F ﬁrms in regiont -0.0004 0.0026 0.0128*** 0.0123***
( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0036 )
H ﬁrms in industryt -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007
( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0004 )
H ﬁrms in regiont 0.0002 0.0021 0.0076*** 0.0079***
( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0020 )
F investment in regiont -0.1671 -0.0493 -0.0781 -0.1324
( 0.1826 ) ( 0.1904 ) ( 0.0901 ) ( 0.0877 )
F investment in industryt 0.0724 -0.0129 -0.0058 -0.0229
( 0.1408 ) ( 0.1416 ) ( 0.0649 ) ( 0.0579 )
H investment in regiont 0.5246 -0.0931 1.4159** 1.0123
( 0.7106 ) ( 0.5678 ) ( 0.5886 ) ( 0.6176 )
H investment in industryt 0.3142 0.3078 0.2491 0.1998
( 0.3100 ) ( 0.3927 ) ( 0.1840 ) ( 0.1895 )
N 431 431 1023 1023
Sargan test – 0.671 – 0.453
SOC 0.831 0.760 0.187 0.229
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F ﬁrms in
region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedas-
tic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the
10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explana-
tory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano–Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all estimations
calculated using DPD package for Ox.
29Table 8: GMM estimation for city and non–city region ﬁrms.
city non–city
one–step two–step one–step two–step
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt−1 0.1340*** 0.0884 0.0394 0.0369
( 0.0498 ) ( 0.0596 ) ( 0.0497 ) ( 0.0568 )
Labort 0.0097 0.2592 0.7724 0.1333
( 0.4932 ) ( 0.4498 ) ( 0.4849 ) ( 0.4870 )
F ﬁrms in industryt 0.0110*** 0.0092** 0.0044 0.0031
( 0.0036 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0039 )
F ﬁrms in regiont 0.0043** 0.0049** 0.0009 0.0038
( 0.002 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.0043 )
H ﬁrms in industryt -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0007
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 )
H ﬁrms in regiont 0.0019 0.0020 0.0111*** 0.0103***
( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0027 )
F investment in regiont -0.0641 -0.0419 0.0571 0.0046
( 0.0556 ) ( 0.0567 ) ( 0.0849 ) ( 0.0846 )
F investment in industryt -0.0746 -0.0846* -0.0402 -0.0045
( 0.0521 ) ( 0.0505 ) ( 0.580 ) ( 0.0580 )
H investment in regiont 0.9195*** 0.8821*** 1.9932*** 1.4743***
( 0.3060 ) ( 0.3122 ) ( 0.5749 ) ( 0.5409 )
H investment in industryt 0.1907 -0.0063 0.0951 -0.0041
( 0.1577 ) ( 0.1549 ) ( 0.1642 ) ( 0.1524 )
N 1603 1603 1946 1946
Sargan test 0.202 0.687 0 0.048
FOC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SOC 0.857 0.874 0.747 0.843
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F ﬁrms in
region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedas-
tic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the
10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explana-
tory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano–Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all estimations
calculated using DPD package for Ox.
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